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Why do firms reimburse job applicants’ relocation 
costs? 
 
Abstract: We develop an equilibrium job search model in which employees incur 
commuting costs, and residential relocation is costly.  We demonstrate that firms 
partially compensate workers for the incurred relocation costs to avoid paying 
compensation for commuting costs. 
 
1. Introduction 
The relationship between residential mobility and residential relocation costs has 
extensively been investigated (see, among others, Boehm, 1981; Englund, 1986; 
Lundborg and Skedinger, 1999 and Pinto, 2002).  Far less attention has been given to the 
implications of firms’ recruitment policies for residential moving behaviour.  In the 
current paper, we aim to explain the empirical observation that many private and public 
firms reimburse residential relocation costs. In the United Kingdom, 22% of 
managerial/professional employees receive a contribution to relocation expenses at the 
moment of recruitment (RCI, 2001). Although we do not have such detailed information 
for other countries, anecdotal evidence suggests reimbursement of relocation expenses is 
universal. 
 
This raises the question why firms reimburse residential relocation costs? Such a question 
is relevant from a theoretical and a policy point of view. From a theoretical perspective, 
reimbursement of residential relocation costs is interesting, because it induces employees 
to reduce the journey to work. From a policy perspective, reimbursement is relevant for 
two reasons. First, reimbursement of residential moving costs affects the effectiveness of 
transport policies. Second, reimbursement of residential relocation costs is sometimes 
treated as taxable income, when it exceeds a threshold (in the Netherlands, shipping costs 
plus 5445 EUR or 12% of annual income). Presumably, such a threshold is imposed to 
avoid tax evasion (i.e. firms pay wages by means of reimbursements). Nevertheless, since 
we will demonstrate that firms reimburse residential relocation costs for efficiency 
reasons, it will be inefficient to impose such a low threshold. Taxing reimbursement 
would therefore increase average commuting costs, reduce the probability of a match, and 
increase unemployment. 
 
The current paper aims to address reimbursement of relocation costs by developing a 
commuting model which explicitly takes labour market imperfections and wage 
bargaining between workers and employers into account. More generally, the current 
paper can be interpreted as an attempt to understand commuting behaviour from a job 
search perspective. Job search theory is currently the main theoretical and empirical 
framework to analyse labour markets, building on the work of Stigler (1961, 1962). 
Search theory allows for market imperfections (lack of information, moving costs), and 
therefore avoids the problems associated with the standard urban economics model which 
assumes that markets are perfect (see Anas, 1982; Hamilton, 1982, 1989). The current 
study makes use of an equilibrium search model, also referred to as a job matching 
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model. Search behaviour of job seekers and employers are both explicitly modelled and 
commuting costs, wages, number of unemployed and number of vacancies are 
endogenously determined. 
 
The outline of the current paper is as follows. In section 2 we introduce an equilibrium 
job search model, which includes commuting, but excludes residential moving behaviour. 
In section 3, we extend the model by including residential moving behaviour and 
relocation costs. Section 4 focuses on implications of the model. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The basic job matching model 
 
2.1 The job matching function  
We presume a continuum of identical firms and residences, which are homogeneously 
distributed over a two-dimensional space, so spatial variation in house prices is absent. 
The economy is closed. Each residence is inhabited by one individual, who is either 
unemployed or employed. The unemployed search for jobs, the employed do not search 
(for an equilibrium model which includes on-the-job search, see Mortensen, 1994). The 
employed incur commuting costs t, where t includes both monetary and travel time costs. 
The unemployed search throughout geographical space, facing a density of commuting 
costs g(t). The commuting costs become known at the moment the unemployed job 
seeker and firm contact each other. A firm consists of only one job, which is either filled 
or unfilled. In order to fill a job, firms post a vacancy.  
 
Initially, we presume that workers do not move residence, because residential relocation 
costs are infinite, and unemployed pay job entry costs d at the moment of becoming 
employed. Job entry costs include the purchase of new clothing or equipment, and the 
costs of adjusting to the new environment, tasks and colleagues (Burgess, 1992). The 
reason we introduce job entry costs is not so much its empirical relevance (Burgess, 
1992), but it is mainly to facilitate derivation and interpretation of the results when we 
analyse residential relocation costs in section 3. For a partial equilibrium analysis of job 
entry costs and job mobility, see, among others, Burgess, 1992 and Van den Berg, 1992. 
 
Suppose there are L identical individuals in the labour force. We let u denote the 
unemployment rate and  v denote the vacancy rate, defined as number of vacant jobs as a 
fraction of the labour force L. We assume the existence of a matching function that gives 
the number of contacts between unemployed and firms as a function of the number of 
unemployed uL looking for jobs and the number of firms looking for workers vL. The 
number of contacts taking place per unit of time is given by ),( vLuLmmL = .The matching 
function is assumed increasing in both its arguments, concave, and has constant returns to 
scale. Empirical studies generally accept the assumption of an aggregate matching 
function with constant returns to scale, see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). 
 
Given the matching function, the probability for a vacancy to be contacted per unit of 
time, denoted as q, is defined. Given the constant returns to scale assumption, it follows 
that 
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where θ=v/u. So, θ is a measure of labour market tightness, defined as the ratio of the 
vacancy to the unemployment rate. Thus, q, the rate at which vacancies become 
contacted, depends negatively on the ratio of the vacancy to the unemployment rate, θ, 
and to emphasise this, we will denote the vacancy contact rate as q(θ). Similarly, it can be 
seen that the rate at which unemployed become contacted equals θq(θ), where θq(θ) 
depends positively on θ.  
 
2.2 Employed and Unemployed 
An individual receives a wage w and incurs commuting costs t when employed, and 
receives unemployment benefits z when unemployed. The unemployed pay job entry 
costs d when moving into employment. When employed, the commuting costs are 
exogenous to the worker. In contrast, the wage is endogenous. Given the value of the 
commuting costs t, firm and unemployed will bargain about the wage w, so w =w(t). The 
worker will not keep the job forever. The job will be destroyed at rateλ and the worker 
will then become unemployed. The discount rate is denoted as r.  
 
We denote by U and W(t) the expected (discounted) lifetime income of the unemployed 
and employed respectively. The lifetime income of the employed can be written as: 
 
))(()()( tWUttwtrW −+−= λ .  (1) 
 
The lifetime income of the employed is equal to the sum of the net wage - the wage 
minus the commuting costs - and the expected change in lifetime income due to the 
probability of losing the job. We will show later on that w(t) –t is decreasing in t. This 
implies that also W(t) is decreasing in t. 
 
When firms and unemployed contact each other, the commuting costs become known and 
they will form a match when W(t) > U + d. There exists a maximum acceptable 
commuting cost T, called the reservation commuting costs, at which the unemployed (and 
the firm) is indifferent between forming a match or continuing searching (for a proof see 
section 2.5). It follows that only jobs incurring commuting costs less than T are accepted. 
The fraction of  acceptable jobs can be written as:  
 
,)()(
0
∫ ==T GTGdttg   (2) 
 
where g(t) is the density of commuting costs. So, the unemployed become employed at 
rate Gθq (θ). When unemployed, the job seeker does not know the value of the 
commuting costs, implying that the lifetime utility of the unemployed can be written as: 
 
))(( dUWqGzrU e −−+= θθ ,  (3) 
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where We denotes the conditional expectation of the lifetime income when employed, so 
)( TtWEW e ≤= . Interpretation of this Bellman equation is as follows: the unemployed 
receives benefits z and has per unit of time a probability Gθq(θ) of becoming employed, 
and expects to receive an increase in lifetime income equal to We –U – d.  
 
2.3 Job creation 
The value of a vacancy, V, can be written as: 
 
))(( VJGqpcrV e −+−= θ ,  (4) 
 
where pc denotes the firms' hiring costs, which are presumed to be proportional to 
productivity.  Vacancies are filled at rate Gq(θ) and Je denotes the conditional expectation 
of the job' s net worth. The value of an occupied job is equal to the productivity level, 
denoted as p, minus the wage, w(t), taking into account that with probability λ  the job 
will be destroyed. Hence, the value of the filled job can be written as: 
 
( ) ( ) )(tJtwptrJ λ−−= , or, similarly, λ+
−
=
r
twp
tJ )()( .  (5) 
 
In equilibrium, all profit opportunities from new jobs are assumed to be exploited, 
driving rents from vacant jobs to zero, so V = 0. This equilibrium condition determines 
the supply of vacancies, implying that: 
 
)(
)()(
θ
λλ
Gq
pcr
wpJr ee +=−=+ ,  (6) 
 
where we denotes the conditional expectation of the wage. Equation (6) states that the 
expected net return of the job ( ewp − ) is equal to the expected capitalised value of the 
firm's hiring cost. This condition is usually referred to as the job creation condition 
(Pissarides, 2000). 
 
2.4 Wage determination 
Recall that the commuting costs become known at the moment the unemployed job 
seeker and firm contact each other. The commuting costs are a drawing from a known  
distribution. Given the commuting costs, the unemployed and firm bargain about the 
wage level, and may then accept or reject the match.  In equilibrium, job matches yield a 
local-monopoly surplus. We assume that the total surplus, equal to the sum of the 
workers' surplus, W(t)-U-d, and the firms' surplus, J(t)-V, is shared according to the Nash 
solution to a bargaining problem, employing the following rule: 
 
ββ −
−−−=
1))(())(max(arg)( VtJdUtWtw ,  (7) 
 
where β is a measure of the workers' labour strength, other than the 'threat points' U and 
V. It can also be interpreted as the workers' share of the total surplus. We presume that 
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0<β<1. The first-order equation satisfies: 
 
).)((
1
)( VtJdUtW −
−
=−− β
β
  (8) 
 
This equation implies that firms and workers agree on which job matches to accept, and 
which to reject.1 The wage can then be written as (see Appendix 1): 
 
θββλββ pcpdrtztw +++−++−= ))(1())(1()( ,     t≤T  (9) 
 
where (r+ λ)d denotes the expected capitalised value of the job entry costs.  
Equation (9) shows that the wage depends positively on commuting costs t and job entry 
costs d.  Interpretation of these effects is as follows. Conditional on the commuting costs, 
firms and job seekers bargain about the wage. The higher the commuting costs, the 
smaller is the worker’s surplus from the match (which is equal to W(t)- U - d), so the 
worker will ask (and receive) a higher wage to be compensated. Similarly, the worker 
will be partially compensated for the job entry costs. The effect of the job entry costs on 
the wage depends on the discount rate r and the destruction rate λ, as the entry costs have 
to be paid upfront.2 The worker is partially compensated for the job entry costs d by 
means of a higher wage, implying that the worker bears a risk, because job entry costs are 
paid upfront by the worker. Because workers and firms are both assumed to be risk 
neutral, equation (9) implies that another solution of the bargaining problem is that firms 
pay once (1-β)d to the unemployed, and pay no compensation as part of the wage. 
 
The equation also shows that the wage is increasing in the unemployment benefit level, 
the productivity level and the average hiring costs per unemployed (pcθ is equal to the 
hiring costs times the number of vacancies divided by the number of unemployed and can 
be interpreted as the average hiring costs per unemployed). Finally, note that the current 
interpretation of equation (9) is partial, because θ is an endogenous variable. 
 
 
2.5 Reservation commuting costs 
Job seekers and firms form a match when the commuting costs are less than the 
reservation commuting costs T. The existence of the reservation commuting costs can be 
easily shown.3 The reservation commuting costs T can be derived by imposing that W(T) 
- U is equal to d, so J is equal to 0 (see (8)). The latter condition implies that (see (5)): 
                                                           
1
 In equilibrium, V = 0, so when J is less than 0, W - U is also less than d, therefore firms 
and job seekers agree not to form a match. In contrast, when J exceeds 0, W - U exceeds 
d, so firms and job seekers both agree to form a match. When J = 0, and therefore W - U 
= d, firm and job seeker are both indifferent to forming a match or continuing searching. 
2
  The effect of the job entry costs on the wage is also determined by the bargaining 
position of the unemployed, measured by 1-β.  
3
 The net wage, defined as the wage minus the commuting costs, is decreasing in the 
commuting costs, since 1-β<1 (see (9)). This implies that lifetime income W is a 
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0)( =− Twp .  (10) 
 
So the firm pays a wage equal to the productivity level, when the incurred commuting 
costs are equal to the reservation commuting costs. Using the wage equation (see (9)), the 
reservation commuting costs can be written as: 
 
.)(
1
drpczpT λθβ
β
+−
−
−−=   (11) 
 
So, the reservation commuting costs are equal to the productivity level minus the sum of 
the unemployment benefits, a share of the average hiring costs per unemployed and the 
expected capitalised value of the job entry costs.  
 
2.6 Equilibrium 
In the steady state, the rate of individuals who enter unemployment, λ(1-u), must be 
equal to the rate who would leave unemployment, uGθq(θ).  So, the unemployment rate 
can be written as 
 
)(θθλ
λ
qG
u
+
= .  (12) 
 
The expected wage, we, can be written as: 
 
drpcptzw ee ))(1())(1( λβθβββ +−++++−= .  (13) 
 
where te denotes the expected commuting costs and )(
)(
)|( 0
TG
dtttg
TttEt
T
e
∫
=≤= .  
As discussed above, the partial effect of job entry costs (so keeping labour market 
tightness constant) on the wage is positive as workers are partially compensated for the 
capitalised value of the job entry costs. In equilibrium however, an increase in the job 
entry costs decreases labour market tightness. This can be demonstrated by incorporating 
the expected wage equation (13) into the job creation condition (6): 
 
.)(
)())()(1( θβ
θ
λλβ pc
Gq
pcrdrtzp e =+−+−−−−    (14) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
decreasing function of the commuting costs t (see (1)), which is a sufficient condition for 
the existence of the reservation commuting cost T.  
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Equation (14) can be solved uniquely for θ.4 Given θ, the reservation commuting costs T 
are determined (see (11)), and given θ and T, the equilibrium unemployment rate u is 
determined (12).  So, the full equilibrium has been defined. The comparative statics 
results can be found in Table 1. Proofs can be provided along the lines of Pissarides 
(2000). For example, the overall effect of higher job entry costs on the expected wage can 
be demonstrated using Figure 1. The wage curve is an increasing function of labour 
market tightness, whereas the job creation curve implies a negative relationship between 
the wage and labour market tightness. The job creation curve does not depend on the job 
entry costs (see (6)), whereas the expected wage curve shifts up where the job entry costs 
increase (see (13)). Consequently, the overall effect of higher job entry costs is an 
increase in the expected wage. The negative effect on labour market tightness follows 
from the same figure.  
 
3. The job matching model with residential moving behaviour  
 
3.1 When does a job match trigger a residential move?  
We extend the equilibrium job search model by introducing residential moves and 
residential relocation costs, denoted as m, but we will further ignore job entry costs d, so 
d = 0. The worker will then either reduce the commuting costs by moving residence at the 
moment of recruitment, or will not move at all. We presume that the worker can freely 
choose the new location of the residence. It is optimal for the worker to choose a location 
as close as possible to the new workplace, so when workers move residence commuting 
costs will be reduced to zero. We will demonstrate in this section that the decision to 
move residence depends negatively on the residential relocation costs m and positively on 
the commuting costs at the moment of recruitment. Workers are partially compensated 
for the residential relocation costs. It will also be demonstrated that employees move 
residence when the commuting costs at the moment of application exceed a threshold, 
denoted as T*. One of the consequences is that a contact generates a job match, either not 
accompanied by a residential move (when t ≤ T*) or accompanied by a residential move 
(when t >T*). 
 
It can be seen that T*, defined as the minimum commuting costs which trigger a 
residential move, must be smaller than the reservation commuting costs T, which are 
defined as the maximum commuting costs when residential moves are inhibited, i.e. 
when residential relocation costs are infinite.5  
 
Given the opportunity to move residence the lifetime income of the unemployed can be 
written as: 
                                                           
4
 By differentiating equation (14) with respect to the reservation commuting costs, we 
find that two effects that T has on it, through et  and through G(T), cancel each other out, 
so the value of θ can be shown to be independent of T, an envelope property implied by 
the optimality of T. 
5
 The proof is as follows. Presume that T*>T, so job contacts implying commuting costs 
between T* and T will be rejected, whereas contacts implying commuting costs larger 
than T* will lead to a job match. Such behaviour is clearly irrational, implying that T*≤T. 
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)1)()(())(( HUWqHmUWqzrU esem −−+−−+= θθθθ ,  (15) 
 
where emW  and 
e
sW  denote the expected lifetime income when the newly employed 
worker moves residence and the expected lifetime income when the worker stays in the 
same residence, and where H denotes the probability of moving residence, given a job 
contact. So, ∫ =−= *
0
*).()(1
T
THdttgH
 Let mw  and ws denote the wage of movers and 
stayers respectively. It can be shown (in a similar way as equation (9)) that: 
 
θββλββ pcpmrzwm +++−+−= ))(1()1( , t≥T*  (16) 
 
θβββ pcptztws +++−= ))(1()( ,     t≤T*  (17) 
 
Equation (16) indicates that the wage of movers does not depend on the commuting costs 
t at the moment of the job contact. It indicates that the firm will partially reimburse the 
relocation costs, and reimbursement is equal to mr ))(1( λβ +− , where mr )( λ+  denotes 
the capitalised relocation costs. Hence, firms partially compensate workers for the 
incurred relocation costs to avoid paying compensation for commuting costs. The 
interpretation of (17) is similar to the interpretation of (9).  
 
The newly recruited worker will move residence when sm WmW ≥− . The value of T* is 
determined by the condition *)(*)( TWmTW sm =− . Using equation (1), this condition  
implies that:  
 
*)(*)( TmrTww sm −+=− λ .  (18) 
 
Consequently, when the employee is indifferent between moving or staying, the wage 
‘premium’ received by movers equals the capitalised relocation costs minus the 
commuting costs. Equations (16) and (17) imply that wm - ws(T*)=(1-β)(λ+r)m-(1-β)T*. 
Using this result with equation (18) implies that  wm - ws(T*)=0.  It follows, using 
equation (18), that T* can be written as: 
 
.)(* mrT += λ   (19) 
  
It appears that T* has a straightforward interpretation. T* is equal to the expected 
capitalised relocation costs and does not depend on any other endogenous or exogenous 
parameter of the model. Equation (18) implies that the wage of movers exceeds the wage 
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of stayers (see Figure 2). Equation (19) implies that the maximum observed commuting 
costs are an increasing function of λ , r and m.6  
 
3.2 Equilibrium 
The equilibrium, presuming T*<T, is characterised by the following equations: 
 
The unemployment rate equilibrium: 
 
.)(θθλ
λ
q
u
+
=                                                                                                         (20) 
 
The job creation condition: 
 
.)(
)(
θ
λ
q
pcr
wp e +=−                                                                                                (21) 
 
The expected wage equation is defined as follows: 
e
sm
e wHwHw )1(. −+= ,                                                                                         
where the expected wage of stayers, esw , can be written as: 
 
θβββ pcptzw eses +++−= ))(1( .                                                                          
 
Here, est denotes the expected commuting costs of stayers, and is defined as follows: 
.
*)(1
)(
*)|(
*
0
TH
dtttg
TttEt
T
e
s
−
=≤=
∫
 
So, the expected wage can be written as: 
 
e
s
e
n tHmrHpcpzw )1)(1())(1()1( βλβθβββ −−++−+++−= .   (22) 
 
So, the expected wage is an increasing function of θ and T*, and Figure 1 is still 
applicable. 
 
The minimum commuting costs which trigger a residential relocation are written as:  
 
.)(* mrT += λ  
                                                           
6
 This suggests that in countries where residential relocation costs are high and job 
turnover is high (in the current model captured by λ ), commuting costs tend to be higher.  
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The probability of moving residence, H, equals ∫− *
0
.)(1
T
dttg  
The equilibrium values of T*, H and est are easily determined and do not need more 
explanation. Equilibrium is essentially a triple (u, θ, we) that satisfies the flow 
equilibrium condition (20), the job creation condition (21) and the expected wage 
condition (22). Equations (21) and (22) determine the expected wage rate and the ratio of 
vacancies to unemployment; given the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, equation (20) 
determines unemployment.  
 
3.3 The effect of residential relocation costs 
To analyse the effect of the residential relocation costs we proceed in a similar way as in 
section 2.6 when we analysed the effect of job entry costs. An increase in residential 
relocation costs increases the wage of stayers (because the expected commuting costs 
increase) and the wage of movers (because compensation for relocation costs increases) 
and therefore increases the expected wage we. So, in equilibrium, an increase in 
residential relocation costs decreases labour market tightness (see, similarly, Figure 1), 
and increases the unemployment rate (see (20)).  
 
The condition T* < T implies that θβ
βλ pczpmr
−
−−<+
1
)( , see equations (19) and 
(11), where job entry costs d are equal to zero. If this condition is not fulfilled, 
irrespective of the commuting costs, workers will not move residence, because the 
capitalised residential relocation costs exceed the increase in lifetime utility of becoming 
employed (so W-U-m<0). Hence, when relocation costs are ‘too high’, firms will not 
compensate relocation costs, and job seekers and firms will not form a match when 
commuting costs exceed T (see section 2).  
 
The full comparative statics results can be found in Table 2. The effects of the model 
including residential mobility (Table 2) are, in many cases, more precise than the model 
excluding residential mobility (Table 1). For example, including residential mobility, an 
increase in the productivity level unambiguously increases the number of vacancies, 
whereas, excluding residential mobility, the effect is ambiguous. See Pissarides (2000, p. 
163) for a similar result when introducing stochastic job matching. The most interesting 
finding is that the effects on the expected commuting costs are different. Given the 
opportunity to move residence (i.e. relatively low relocation costs), the expected 
commuting costs depend merely on three parameters (λ, r, m) and do not depend on 
labour market variables such as the productivity level. In contrast, when workers do not 
have the opportunity to move residence (i.e. relatively high relocation costs), it is 
plausible that the productivity level is one of the main determinants of the expected 
commuting costs (see equation (11)).7  
                                                           
7
 This finding suggests that findings of commuting studies in Europe (where relocation 
costs are high due to transaction taxes) are difficult to generalise to the USA. For 
example, the current model suggests that the level of education, which is a proxy for 
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4. Implications 
 
4.1 Risk neutrality 
One of the implications of the model is that workers pay for the relocation costs m 
upfront, and are compensated by means of a higher wage equal to a share (1-β) of the 
capitalised relocation costs, (r+λ)m. This implies that workers bear a risk. Because 
workers and firms are risk neutral, an alternative equivalent solution to the wage 
bargaining problem is that firms pay (1-β)m to the relocated worker at the moment of 
recruitment, and pay no compensation as part of the wage. Hence, the model is neutral 
whether compensation is paid once upfront or spread out over time as part of the wage. 
We will focus here on two possible extensions. 
 
One possible extension of the model is to assume that firms are risk neutral, whereas 
workers are risk averse. Such an assumption is in particular appropriate for large firms 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). This assumption implies that (large) firms compensate 
relocation costs upfront. Another possible extension is to assume that workers and firms 
are both risk averse, combined with the assumptions that the job destruction rate is 
endogenously determined by the firm and to allow for search on the job (Pissarides, 
2000). Although such an extension is beyond the aims of the current paper, one expects 
that workers (firms) are not willing to bear all the risk, due to adverse behavioural effects 
of firms (workers). Note that this argument cannot be deduced from the model. Finally, 
when once-only reimbursement payments of relocation costs are not taxed, whereas 
wages are, then it is plausible that workers are compensated upfront. 
 
4.2 Willingness-to-pay estimates 
In the transport literature, there is now a large literature on the marginal willingness to 
pay for commuting time, see Small (1992). This literature is based on a variety of 
methods to estimate the willingness to pay for commuting including hedonic wage 
methods. In essence, hedonic wage methods imply that the worker’s wage is regressed on 
commuting time/distance (see for example Zax, 1991). Recently, Van Ommeren et al. 
(2000) reported that the hedonic wage willingness-to-pay estimates for the Netherlands 
are lower than when alternative estimation methods are used. In line with these findings, 
the current job matching model indicates that hedonic wage estimates are downward 
biased (estimates are closer to zero), because the hedonic wage method ignores that 
workers with a short commute may receive compensation for the relocation costs.8  
 
4.3 Tax treatment of reimbursement of relocation costs 
Taxes on fringe benefits tend to be less than taxes on wages, which gives an incentive to 
firms to compensate workers by means of fringe benefits (Lazear, 1998). In the 
Netherlands, reimbursement of relocation costs is accepted as a non-taxable fringe benefit 
                                                                                                                                                                             
productivity, should have a stronger effect on the commuting costs in Europe than in the 
USA. 
8
 Note that this bias is particularly likely to occur in Europe where relocation costs are 
high due to high transaction taxes (up to 10 percent of the value of the residence). 
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under specific circumstances (e.g. the worker must have moved residence closer to the 
workplace) up to a low threshold. Average relocation costs (of owners) are about 3 times 
as high as the threshold.9 So, a large share of the reimbursement of relocation costs is 
taxed, which increases the effective costs of relocation, and thus increases average 
commuting costs (see section 3). 
 
4.4 Spatial variation in house prices   
The current model has been based on the assumption that there is no spatial variation in 
house prices, in contrast to most of the urban economics literature (Fujita, 1999).  The 
monocentric urban model presumes endogenous (spatially varied) house prices, but 
ignores relocation costs (Wasmer and Zenou, 2002). The main message of the 
monocentric urban model literature is that house prices fully compensate workers for 
commuting costs. Consider a multiregional structure where in each region employment is 
concentrated in the centre. Then one may expect that reimbursement of residential 
relocation costs does not occur (or occurs less frequently) when workers move within the 
same urban area, and the change in commuting costs is compensated via house prices. 
However, reimbursement is expected to occur when a worker moves interregionally (see 
Zax, 1994, for a more general view on the distinction between intraregional and 
interregional mobility). 
 
5. Conclusion 
We set out to analyse the effects of residential relocation costs on workers’ compensation 
aiming to explain the stylised fact that many firms compensate residential relocation costs 
(RCI, 2001). We demonstrate that firms partially compensate workers for the incurred 
relocation costs to avoid paying compensation for commuting costs. As a result, an 
increase in residential relocation costs increases commuting costs and the equilibrium 
unemployment rate. In case that relocation costs are ‘too high’, firms do not compensate 
relocation costs, which reduces the probability of a job match, so implying a higher 
equilibrium unemployment rate. One of the policy implications is that treating 
reimbursement of relocation costs as taxable income may raise average commuting costs.  
                                                           
9
 As mentioned in section 1, the threshold is maximally 5445 Euro. The average value of 
a dwelling is close to 150,000 Euro, whereas monetary relocation costs due to transaction 
taxes are at least 10% of the value of the dwelling. 
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Appendix 
Equations (6) and (8) imply that: 
 
)(1 θβ
β
q
pcdUW e
−
=−−   (24) 
 
whereas equations (2) and (24) imply that: 
 
pczrU β
βθ
−
+=
1
.  (25) 
 
Further, equation (1) can be rewritten as: 
 
λ+
−−
=−
r
rUtwUW .  (26) 
 
Making use of equations (8) and (15) and the 3 above mentioned equations reveals that: 
 
λβ
β
λ
β
βθ
λ +
−
−
=−
+
−
−−−
=−
+
−−
=−−
r
wpd
r
cpztw
d
r
rUtwdUW
1
1
.  (27) 
 
Reordering of the last part of the equation, gives wage equation (9). 
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Table 1 Comparitive Statics of a job search model excluding residential mobility 
 
 T θ u v G we te 
β
 
? - + ? ? + ? 
p + + - ? + + + 
z - - + ? - ? - 
r ? - + ? ? ? ? 
λ
 
? - + ? ? ? ? 
c ? - + ? ? ? ? 
d ? - + ? ? + ? 
Note: + = positive; - = negative; ? = ambigious 
 
 
 
Table 2 Comparitive Statics of a job search model including residential mobility 
 
 T* θ
 
u v H we te 
β 0 - + - 0 + 0 
p 0 + - + 0 + 0 
z 0 - + - 0 + 0 
r + - + + - ? + 
λ
 
+ - - ? - ? + 
c 0 - + - 0 ? 0 
m + - + - - + + 
Note: + = positive; - = negative; ? = ambigious 
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Figure 1 Wages and labour market tightness 
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Figure 2 Wages of movers and stayers as a function of commuting costs 
 w
t 
ws 
wm 
T* 
